Opposition leader Raila Odinga boycotted this and launched a new opposition movement, although probable fragmentation prevents an effective legislative boycott. However, reappointment of the finance minister does indicate more concerted fiscal consolidation efforts. New renewable energy projects are a low government priority.
Nairobi experiences the second highest absolute levels of Kenya is the seventh most violent country in the ACLED violence in Kenya, after the Rift Valley, and the highest dataset with just over 3, recorded politically violent levels of riots and protests.
Nairobi is also the region in events between and September Kenya has the which violent events involving state forces are highest, 12th highest rate of reported fatalities associated with with almost one-third of all violent events involving state political violence, at over 7, Levels of violent events forces taking place in the capital.
Electoral cycles In absolute terms, levels of conflict in Kenya since are coincide with some conflict peaks, but as this report will comparable to those in Uganda 3, events and South detail, Kenya experiences multiple, overlapping conflicts, Africa 3, eventsalthough the composition of this which profoundly shape the nature of conflict and vulner- violence by type is markedly different.
Unlike Uganda, ability of civilian populations in particular to violence. National-level trends mask dramatic regional variations in the types, tactics and per- Elections Election Election Election Figure 1: Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.
Militia activity and electoral violence: The prevalence of these groups is reflected in the dynam- ics of state responses to non-state actors. Violent events The category of militia violence includes private armies for involving state forces are twice as likely to involve political elites and politicians, militant groups whose aims are lo- militias at recorded events involving both actor calised, and do not seek to overthrow, replace or secede types than communal militias at recorded eventsfrom the state; in addition to actions and almost four times as likely as those by unidentified armed groups which Militia groups, including involving state forces and the main rebel are not claimed by named militant or- private armies and group active in the country, Al Shabaab ganisations for more information on at 81 recorded events involving both actor type definitions, see the ACLED localised militant groups, actor types.
The year in the country, at over recorded in Kenya. As a proportion tional levels of militia violence recorded of violent actors, political militias were recorded as being in Kenya at It is rather the nature of their role as pri- ians during this time, militia units can take on this role in marily ad hoc, informal agents of elite forces that explains widespread attacks on non-combatants with relative im- why they serve as a more convenient conduit for civilian punity.
These groups typically engage in violence against other identity groups in pur- suit of local goals and objectives: They are distinguished from rebel groups, who are seeking the overthrow or replacement of the state regime, and politi- cal militias, which may be aligned with particu- lar political parties or elites, but are not neces- sarily ethnically, religiously or communally defined.
Communal Violence by Location, Kenya, - October Combined, communal militias are the most active violent actor category in Kenya, involved in almost one-third Kenya has an extremely high rate of communal violence Continental by continental standards.
Communal militias targeting averages differ significantly: Communal that this type of actor is a pronounced issue for Kenya militias engaging in armed conflict with one another is the more so than its neighbours.
Overall levels of communal fifth most common interaction in the Kenyan data, with militia activity are comparable to those found in high con- 4 over recorded events. KENYA December flict states such as Somalia and Nigeria, while the propor- Secondly and relatedly, disarmament campaigns have tion of overall violence attributed to violent communal been subject to wider regional failure: At a fatalities per event, but far ahead of active violent actor in structural level, poor infrastructure and state forces and political militias, at Kenya, involved in almost poorly paid police and security forces 1.
Government responses have in- activity in the country. This is a particularly pressing danger in the context of on- First, the widespread availability of light weaponry is more going decentralization in Kenya which, though it promises often a symptom of conflict, than a driver in and of itself.
A far lower propor- land, and political representation. In these conditions, communities may have con- clashes in Mandera and Moyale, while the high level of cerns about their ability to defend themselves in the organisation which was apparent in the communal vio- event of uneven disarmament, and in the absence of ex- lence which occurred in the Tana River region in August tensive or consistent state responses to armed violence by suggests elite sponsorship or support may have been communal groups.
Each has witnessed distinct patterns of ment. While Al Shabaab had been active in Kenya prior to its intervention - and indeed, attacks attributed to Al Sha- Kenya made headlines worldwide in Septemberbaab in the run-up to October were cited as a justifi- when Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack on cation for initervention - the frequency and scale of at- the Westgate shopping complex in Nairobi that claimed at tacks has increased dramatically in the aftermath.
Be- least 67 lives. Since mid-Octoberover events have been attributed to Al Shabaab in Kenya, an average of over one per week.
The nature of Al Shabaab violence has also changed: Beyond international considerations, there are also impor- tant lessons and implications of the Westgate attack on the domestic front.
But violent Islamist mobilisa- tion and militancy in Kenya is profoundly shaped by local conditions.Kenya Country Report Draft for review Jennifer Gibson 16 March This is the first draft of the country report for Kenya prepared as part of the research design phase for the joint Save the Children/UNICEF multi-country, multi-year study of the impact of cash transfers on children in.
Kenya Country Risk Report Providing comprehensive data and in-depth analysis of political, financial and economic risk. Report includes: BMI's Core Views, year Forecasts, BMI's Economic Risk Index, Political Stability and Risk Index, Long-term Political Outlook, Operational Risk Index, SWOT Analysis and Structural Economic Sections.
Country Report - Includes Kenya real Gross Domestic Product growth rate, with latest forecasts and historical data, GDP per capita, GDP composition and breakdown by sector. Browse additional economic indicators and data sets, selected by Global Finance editors, to learn more about Kenya economic outlook, debt to GDP ratio, international trade performance and population trends.
SABER teachers country report: Kenya (English) Abstract. The SABER teacher’s tool aims to help fill some of these gaps by collecting, analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating comprehensive information on teacher policies in primary and secondary education systems around the world.
2 — KENYA REPORT Tax Justice Country Report Series This is the second in a series of country reports that tackle tax justice issues. The purpose of these reports is: • To analyze tax structures including national tax systems, distribution of tax, and incentive structures.
COUNTRY REPORT: KENYA December flict states such as Somalia and Nigeria, while the propor- Secondly and relatedly, disarmament campaigns have tion of overall violence attributed to violent communal been subject to wider regional failure: similar campaigns groups is comparable to patterns in .